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Abstract
This article adopts internal colonization as an interpretative frame-
work for the analysis of resettlement practices in the 1940s and 1950s 
in Rotterdam, a city that had been heavily bombed during the Second 
World War. The use of internal colonization presents a new vista on 
the experiments with population management, in particular with regard 
to perceived social misfits, in Rotterdam. Internal colonization permits 
a much more critical reading than existing historiography of postwar 
reconstruction policies that involved the displacement and isolation of 
part of the urban population.
Keywords: internal colonization, postwar reconstruction, social re-
education, Rotterdam
Introduction
‘Internal colonization’, wrote an observer in 1930, is ‘not [a] definite 
concept’.2 He was right about the indefinite nature of the term, but not 
in ways he could have imagined. ‘Internal colonization’ was associ-
ated with ‘rural areas and other territories for agricultural settlement’.3 
In the same breath, this rural connotation was juxtaposed with more 
urbanized modes of settlement, such as garden cities and suburban 
residential zones. Internal colonization might not have been a fixed 
 concept in 1930, but its contours were rather clear.  From the late nine-
teenth century up until the outbreak of the Second World War, ‘internal 
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colonization’ was used by historical actors to refer to the practice of (re)
claiming land with the combined aim of enabling human settlement and 
fostering agricultural exploitation.
Saliently, the term was reintroduced in scholarly work some three 
decades later. And this time ‘internal colonization’, once again show-
ing its indefinite substance, opened up a semantic field that was highly 
indebted to (neo-Marxist) social theory. Internal colonization became 
a normative marker of state-enforced modes of social, economic, and 
ethnic segregation – it was an intentional process undergirded by what 
was negatively perceived as the state-sponsored ideology of internal 
 colonialism.4 This type of colonialism, Michel Foucault and many 
 others after him argued, was due to ‘the boomerang effect’ of (exter-
nal) colonialism, bringing ‘a whole series of colonial models’ back to 
the West – and thus allowing a number of new hegemonic divisions in 
urban society.5
This semantic shift (from rural to mostly urban, from non-norma-
tive description to normative analysis) raises questions about the use of 
internal colonization as an analytical category. As most of the contribu-
tions to this special issue stress, the rural was a common denominator 
among the languages and practices of internal colonization before the 
outbreak of the Second World War. However, if historians look beyond 
‘internal colonization’ as a descriptive category applied to the rural in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the term enables us 
to distinguish a broader set of interrelated historical practices and dis-
courses for which the rural-urban divide is not constitutive.
Here the case study of the resettlement of (a part of) Rotterdam’s 
citizens after the devastating bombardments of the Second World War 
will be read through the lens of internal colonization. This instance of 
resettlement allows us to grasp internal colonization as a collection of 
historical practices that stretches beyond its formerly dominant under-
standing as a rural phenomenon. Thus, internal colonization will be 
understood as an analytical category that is not restricted per se by the 
generally accepted temporal and spatial demarcations in most of the 
historiography.
Against the background of massive devastation, collective trauma, 
and urgent recovery, the accommodation of thousands of homeless vic-
tims was one of the most pressing issues for local authorities in the 
bombed-out cities of Europe in the 1940s and 1950s. In most of the 
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post-blitz reconstruction historiographies, this episode, and its impact 
on the relocation and fragmentation of the urban community, is largely 
outshined by the boastful narratives of spatial redevelopment along the 
lines of modernist urban planning. The perspective of internal colo-
nization opens up a new avenue of interpretation, which enables the 
 critical assessment of governmental practices relating to post-blitz 
reconstruction beyond the tenets of urban planning history. In the case 
of Rotterdam, this approach allows for a much stronger articulation of 
the reconstruction politics that amounted to a social cleansing of the 
city after its physical destruction. Before presenting the case study, 
issues relating to the rural-urban divide, normativity, and the common 
denominators of internal colonization need to be assessed.
Internal Colonization as an Analytical Framework
The assessment of rural-urban distinctions in internal colonization 
has resulted in some awareness of interconnection and interdepend-
ency in historiography. James Scott, in his seminal work Seeing Like 
a State, sees  ‘a project of internal colonization’ as a systemic expres-
sion of modern statecraft, whose practitioners ‘strive to shape a people 
and landscape’.6  Scott’s use of the term landscape, instead of rural or 
 agricultural land, opens up broader conceptions of the environment of 
internal colonization, which is to say it allows the inclusion of urban 
landscapes. One obvious and well-researched historical example of 
internal colonization, the transformation of the Pontine Marshes in 
Fascist Italy, presents an intrinsic inter-permeation of the rural and the 
urban. Here new settlements on rural land expressed urban ambitions 
through the planning of new, medium-sized towns, and existing urban 
centres perceived to be overcrowded were addressed in concomitant 
population policies; densely populated urban areas served as the pools 
of recruitment for new dwellers on the marshes.7 Vice versa, agricultural 
production needed to be expanded to feed the ever-expanding cities.8
The (sub)urban environment might also be considered as a locus 
for internal colonization in its own right during the period 1880–
1940. The auctor intellectualis of the garden city idea, Ebenezer 
Howard, placed the suburban garden city, conceived as a green resi-
dential settlement for urbanites, in line with earlier proposals, quoting 
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a mid-nineteenth-century plan to displace people to ‘a colony well 
beyond the range of London smoke’.9 Before establishing the garden 
city movement, Howard even tried to create an urban ‘Home Colony’ 
in the 1890s.10 We can see that the garden city movement of the early 
twentieth century adopted a discourse very similar to that of rural inter-
nal colonization, albeit with clear (sub)urban intentions.
Thus the re-emergence of the term internal colonization in the social 
sciences in reference to urban phenomena in the 1960s is not entirely 
detached from previous historical discourses. One could argue, how-
ever, that unlike the advocates of the garden city movement, who pos-
tulated a clear rural-urban connection, these scholars delved almost 
exclusively into the urban fabric. The renowned urbanist Kevin Lynch, 
for instance, gave a socio-political definition of internal coloniza-
tion, alluding to spatial divisions in the metropolis. Using apartheid’s 
extreme segregation in Johannesburg as an example, Lynch spoke of 
internal colonization ‘when one clearly demarcated group exploits and 
controls another’.11 The term is also frequently used to refer to oppres-
sion of any kind, for instance in the work on the social segregation of 
African-Americans in American society.12
In his theoretical accounts of (urban) space, Henri Lefebvre stated 
that key to the production of urban space was the state’s ‘attempt to 
homogenize, hierarchize, and to fragment social spaces’.13 Lefebvre’s 
‘internal colonization’ was a signifier of ‘the authoritarian aspects of 
spatial management in Paris and other French cities’.14 Translating 
postwar urban planning in France into a process of ‘internal coloni-
zation’ of French cities, he referred to several grands ensembles and 
new towns as the most pregnant expressions of this process – which 
ultimately gave rise to the lifestyles of those whom Loïc Wacquant has 
called ‘urban outcasts’.15
Lefebvre’s language of internal colonization still resonates in cur-
rent debates about segregation and ethnic conflict in urban France and 
elsewhere. The displacement of immigrants to the metropolitan fringes 
have led to ‘militarized’ and ‘securitized’ forms of internal coloniza-
tion which, in turn, have created France’s new ‘badlands’ – i.e., the 
banlieues – from the 1980s onwards.16 Such a view of the state’s spatial 
regimes links up with what James Scott has distinguished as a quintes-
sential element of contemporary statecraft: ever increasing (political) 
surveillance.17
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At this point, we need to establish a baseline set of signifiers to iden-
tify a connection between historical practices that might fit the analyti-
cal category of internal colonization. I will not try – it would be in vain 
– to enumerate an exhaustive set of criteria, but based on definitions and 
conclusions drawn from the literature, and particularly the considera-
tions salient to this special issue’s introduction, internal colonization 
includes, at least: first, a demarcated space on which human (re)settle-
ment is projected within the geographical borders of a particular polity, 
be it a nation-state or a city; and, second, a predefined aspiration of (re)
settlement effected by the state and sustained by surveillance of the 
internal colony.
Taking into account the urban dimension of internal colonization dis-
courses (historical as well as sociological and normative), and accept-
ing two distinguishing features of internal colonization that inform the 
interpretative framework (demarcated resettlement and statecraft), the 
urban case study, drawn from the interlude between internal coloniza-
tion’s heyday and the emergence of critical social theory, will now be 
introduced.
Post-Blitz Urban Resettlement in the 1940s and 1950s
When war or natural disasters have devastated cities, the shelter needs 
of suddenly homeless populations have been met with a plethora of 
responses. Particularly in the twentieth century, with its unprecedented 
urban scale in the West, many systematic governmental responses 
directed towards resettlement emerged out of chaos or destruction. 
These responses often became part of more enduring projects to re-
allocate housing throughout the urban fabric. For instance, the devas-
tating earthquake that took down most of the Italian city of Messina in 
1908 was followed by a series of temporary mass-housing initiatives, a 
precursor to the Fascist efforts to displace members of the lowest social 
classes to remote residential zones in the 1930s.18 Similarly, the destruc-
tion of many Belgian and French towns near the battlefields of the Great 
War offered an opportunity to reshuffle the populace through mass-
housing plans.19 Moreover, the influx of billeted ammunition workers 
and refugees during the war (the Belgian diaspora to France and the 
Netherlands) prompted the establishment of thousands of emergency 
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workers’ hostels and refugee camps in the urban margins throughout 
Western Europe.
When we come to the Second World War, we find a particular context 
of resettlement. Recent publications have pointed at hardships endured 
by minority groups during the transition between war and peace dur-
ing the mid-1940s.20 Particularly in Eastern and Central Europe, many 
ethnic minorities were set adrift or were forcibly displaced to remote 
places, leading to an unprecedented refugee crisis on the European con-
tinent. Underpinning such exclusionary mechanisms (affecting about 
50 million people) was an increasingly administrative and scientifically 
conceptualized set of criteria for community membership, based on 
varying social, cultural, or ethnic categories.
At the local level, particularly as cities were rebuilt after the bomb-
ings, similar practices of social exclusion became increasingly mani-
fest, though they were of course effected on a smaller scale. In bombed 
cities such as Coventry, London, Rotterdam, and Hamburg, emergency 
policies gave way to considerations of large questions about relocating 
and housing significant segments of the local population. The flattened 
areas not only incited an outburst of modernist spatial planning and 
grand plans for urban redevelopment, but also urged authorities to initi-
ate some form of population management.
The accommodation of people bombed out of their houses was one 
of the most urgent assignments for authorities in blitzed cities. One 
solution to homelessness was the erection of emergency or temporary 
dwellings, which in almost all cases were clustered on the fringes of the 
city. These ‘emergency villages’, in many cases, gradually became stig-
matized as sites for the unfit and the unwanted, as temporary housing 
was mostly aimed at people unable to find or afford shelter elsewhere. 
In one extreme case, in Rotterdam, which will be elaborated further on, 
the emergency villages became subjected to a policy scheme of social 
(re)education and intense surveillance. These villages might be read as 
products of internal colonization, fitting the two requirements of demar-
cated (re)settlement and intentional statecraft.
Reading emergency housing in post-blitz cities in the 1940s and 
1950s through the lens of internal colonization offers clear analytical 
yields. With regard to post–Second World War reconstruction historiog-
raphy, it allows the articulation of the interlude preceding the acclaimed 
resurrection of Western European ‘New Jerusalems’ along the lines of 
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modernist planning. (Planning) literature particularly stresses the new 
– planners, their plans, and their implementation and realization – and 
secondary attention (at most) is directed towards the removal of the old 
– in particular, social groupings throughout the urban environment. In 
Rotterdam, the case study presented in this article, the policy of rehous-
ing the victims of the aerial bombardments allowed local authorities 
to act based on the perceived social qualities of the city’s residents, 
under Nazi rule (from mid-1940 until May 1945) as well as after the 
liberation.
Internal Colonization in Wartime Rotterdam: Stage One
After the major blitz of 14 May 1940, which laid to ashes the whole 
inner city and killed many hundreds of people, nearly 80,000 homeless 
victims roamed Rotterdam’s streets and grounds of debris. A later strike, 
this time by the Allied forces that bombed Nazi-occupied Rotterdam in 
March 1943, killed another 326 people and left more than 16,000 peo-
ple homeless. Most individuals and families either found refuge with 
relatives and friends or moved to nearby towns. Schools, hotels, and 
public buildings were transformed into emergency hostels, temporarily 
accommodating an additional group of victims.21
The latter group of urbanites was unable to find new homes due to 
their lack of social and financial means. Most were the former inhabit-
ants of the vibrant and dilapidated alleys – slums, some even argued 
– of the destroyed inner city. Saliently, in Rotterdam 5000 of the 8000 
dwellings destroyed by the air raids had been listed for demolition 
before the outbreak of war.22
From the summer of 1940 onwards, families from the asylum hos-
tels were entitled to register for placement in an ‘emergency dwelling’, 
a small and cheaply built single-floor house that was part of a series of 
planned complexes of temporary housing on the fringes of the city. In 
total, seven such complexes were realized, allowing about 7500 people 
to be accommodated – some well into the late twentieth century, as 
housing shortages diminished only after the 1960s.
Although the size and social composition of these villages varied, 
they all shared a defining asset: spatial isolation from the city’s resi-
dential districts that had survived the bombing.23 Obviously, finding 
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ample space to build hundreds of temporary dwellings was imperative, 
and the city’s outskirts were a manifest option for such an undertak-
ing. However, the selection of sites for emergency housing reveals a 
clear intent to isolate them from other districts, as they were not placed 
directly adjacent to middle-class areas. Railways, canals, roads, and 
bridges separated the emergency villages from the rest of the city. 
Moreover, in 1941 the municipality of Rotterdam, at the urging of the 
Nazi authorities, annexed a number of neighbouring towns, provok-
ing new ideas about postwar urban expansion.24 These vistas of a new, 
expanding Rotterdam, confirmed the provisional nature of the emer-
gency villages; in the long run, large-scale urban planning would swal-
low them up.
By March 1941, 3000 families – at first individuals without fami-
lies were not permitted to sign up – had registered for an emergency 
dwelling in Rotterdam. About 2100 units were actually built, hous-
ing about 7500 people during wartime. In the summer of 1940, the 
first emergency village, at the Noorderkanaalweg north of the city, 
was completed (see Figure 1). It consisted of 188 wooden dwell-
ings, whose standardized interiors were paid for via deductions from 
war damage payments, the sum of money victims of the bombard-
ments received from the authorities. From the beginning this com-
plex attracted lower-class families. This was due to a number of rea-
sons. First and foremost, the people most urgently in need of a home 
ranked among the poorest inner-city residents of the pre-blitz era. 
Additionally, there was the very effective selection method employed 
by the wartime housing authorities: differentiation by rent. Rent at 
the Noorderkanaalweg complex was very low, and the national gov-
ernment offered compensation to make up for municipal budget def-
icits. Similarly, another complex, at Zuidplein, also attracted many 
families on poor relief or unskilled workers with sub-standard rents. 
Consequently, both complexes ranked at the bottom of an emerging 
social hierarchy among emergency villages, which would soon tap 
into popular stigmatization of ‘villagers’, as the local historian Dick 
Rackwitsz has demonstrated in his work.25
Initiated and administered by a small group of local Dutch officials, 
who demonstrated considerable agency within the hierarchies of power 
installed by the Nazi occupiers, the Noorderkanaalweg complex was 
transformed from a temporary solution to an emergency housing crisis 
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into an experimental space for the surveillance and oppression of those 
perceived to be social misfits.26 This transformation found its clearest 
expression in June 1943, when the Municipal Housing Corporation 
(Gemeentelijke Woningdienst) which managed all emergency houses 
in the city, was forced to hand over formal responsibility for the 
Noorderkanaalweg to the Office of Social Affairs. ‘The anti-social fam-
ily is a family all of whose actions deviate from the prevailing rules 
which to live by in society, thus not only housing,’ was an underlying 
principle for the agency’s oversight.27 The ‘prevailing rules’ were based 
on positive valuations of ‘family relations, marriage relations, house-
hold management, financial management, habitation, neatness, social 
milieu, the nursing and parenting of children, the behaviour of the head 
of the family with regard to society, preparedness to work, sense of 
responsibility and health condition’.28
Figure 1: Depiction of the emergency village at the Noorderkanaalweg by A.F. Hens 
(August 1943) (City Archives Rotterdam).
In general, the 1940s witnessed a behavioural turn in social work, 
expanding its focus: the attention given to housekeeping and the moral 
and psychological state of the individual in the interwar years now 
yielded to concern with a wider range of social attitudes in public and 
private life.29
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The practices that emerged at the Noorderkanaalweg were those of 
the first stage of internal colonization – urban resettlement – combined 
with the aim of social amelioration. Under the aegis of the Housing 
Corporation some social work had been undertaken from June 1942 
onwards, but now a whole new regime was introduced. Families 
deemed normal had to move elsewhere, so as to leave the socially unfit 
in isolation at the complex. Those families unable to move – in 1944 
forty-four ‘normal’ families remained at the complex – were housed 
in the street called ‘A’. The alleys ascended to the letter ‘N’, where 
the most hopeless cases were living in the most confined part, sur-
rounded by canals.30 However, in practice this division did not hold, 
as alleged anti-social families eventually moved into all the streets. All 
inhabitants were placed under supervision by social workers, housing 
inspectors, municipal housekeepers, and medical supervisors. Women 
were obliged to participate in household management courses, children 
were assembled for daily activities and school and the men who did 
not cooperate with the schemes of the employment agency were sent to 
work relief camps in various parts of the country for three months as of 
February 1944.31 Eleven houses were used for various amenities (e.g., 
a library, bath-house, central kitchen, and playroom) and office space.
Rogier van Aerde’s postwar novel Nooddorp (Emergency village, 
1951) provides an account of the surveillance regime then in place, 
describing the village as ‘a concentration camp, sadly lying a few hun-
dred meters off the road. Long rows of low, filthy living barracks – like 
prisoners’ sheds. Only the barbed wire and the watching towers with 
machine guns were lacking …’.32 The leading officials spoke – without 
hesitation – of a ‘kind of police for social relief’, keeping open, in case 
of the scheme’s failure, the option of sterilization, a eugenic hint that 
one also finds in administrative correspondence and reports during the 
war.33
From mid-1944 onwards, official reports, in language ever more 
desperate, tell of intensified surveillance and police assistance. The 
villagers increasingly refused to cooperate with the authorities; social 
workers were thwarted from entering houses; many families were sell-
ing their household goods, resorting to the black market and exchang-
ing their food vouchers for tobacco or alcohol.34 Evaluations tended 
to conclude that the re-education programme as a whole had failed. In 
January 1945, the chief administrator J. Geijs proposed radical isolation 
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of the anti-socials, ‘either in asylums or in camps of anti-socials’, as the 
‘recklessness’ of collective behaviour was now deemed impossible to 
control under the current arrangements.35
Moreover, whereas the first reports, still compiled under the aegis 
of the Housing Corporation, stressed the village’s meager housing and 
impoverished living circumstances, the reports written by the so-called 
Extraordinary Researches division placed full responsibility for the con-
ditions on the inhabitants themselves: ‘… one sees a mentality among 
these families which is aimed at the exploitation of social amenities and 
the perpetuation of life in straitened circumstances. In most cases, the 
men are uneducated stevedores, while the women are spineless, garru-
lous creatures negligent of their duties and with no inclination whatso-
ever to look after their houses or families’.36
The cold winter of 1944–1945 worsened the situation beyond repair. 
Many inhabitants died of starvation and the effects of the cold. Whole 
houses were demolished and used as firewood. After the liberation, in 
May 1945, the Canadian military decided to evacuate the whole vil-
lage, which was demolished by the end of the following month, and 
the remaining residents were offered temporary shelter in an immi-
grants’ hostel.37 Ultimately, Dutch officials, with ministerial approval, 
deported the anti-socials from the hostel to so-called state evacuation 
camps in the rural north of the Netherlands.38 At least forty-six fami-
lies (some three hundred people) from the Noorderkanaalweg complex 
were deported, starting with twenty-eight families in early July 1945.39 
In the late 1940s and 1950s, these camps, which had been founded in 
the 1930s as work relief camps, became ‘family camps’ (gezinsoorden), 
where a new postwar episode of isolated, social re-education under sur-
veillance commenced for the alleged social misfits, including those 
from other Dutch cities as well.40 Saliently, only in the spring of 1947, 
two years after liberation, did the Dutch government put the enforced 
deportations on hold, and then halted the measure.
‘Rotterdam’s Own Soweto’: Stage Two41
The isolation of those perceived to be misfits did not stop after their 
deportation to the countryside. With hindsight, the repressive surveil-
lance and deportation of the ‘anti-social’ civilians of the emergency 
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village Noorderkanaalweg can be interpreted as the first stage of 
Rotterdam’s internal colonization experiment. The removal of these 
unruly residents enabled authorities to shift their focus after the lib-
eration to another category: ‘socially weak’ citizens. The aspiration 
was to create a new internal colony in which the weak urbanites would 
receive moral improvement through fine-grained social re-education 
programmes. Such measures had prewar precedents in Dutch cities 
such as The Hague, Amsterdam, and Utrecht, and continued to exist as 
‘schools for living’ (woonscholen). Unlike the anti-social, the socially 
weak were designated as amenable to improvement through social re-
education schemes.
In 1947 the city of Rotterdam endorsed a resolution that formally 
recognised an emergency village of 525 brick houses, built in 1941, as 
a site to test experimental policies of social re-education. This exper-
iment – a term that was exhaustively employed – became known as 
the Zuidplein Project and encompassed about 570 families (in prac-
tice around 400 were subjected to surveillance and social re-education 
schemes), amounting to approximately 3000 citizens.42
This did not imply that a strict set of predefined categories and 
principles informed social re-education in Rotterdam. Local officials 
showed their awareness of the longstanding Dutch and foreign debates 
about and experiences with the ‘anti-social’ urban problem and the mer-
its of social work, but they also stated that the whole experiment was 
open-ended and geared to be inductive and experience-based. Socially 
weak families had the prospect of becoming acceptably social. Official 
approval entitled them to move to one of Rotterdam’s (new) neighbour-
hoods. Thus upward social mobility underpinned the project, which 
was reflected in its being regularly called a ‘social sanatorium’.43
As such, the second stage of internal colonization was much more 
sophisticated than the wartime endeavours at the Noorderkanaalweg 
complex. It could boast of its reorganized municipal services, its inclu-
sion of voluntary and religious organisations in its governance structure, 
and its large scale: ‘Rotterdam’s own Soweto’, wrote a letter writer to 
a much-read newspaper in 1990, looking back on the project – Soweto 
being one of the typical cases investigated by social scientists under the 
heading of internal colonization in the late twentieth century.
Indeed, Zuidplein can be regarded as a township. Not only due to 
its isolated location within the urban environment, but also because 
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its social composition was perceived to be sub-normal, and because 
it attracted (vernacular) discourses of stigmatization and marginaliza-
tion. In response, local officials and even some newspapers tried to 
boast of the experiment publicly to mitigate the Zuidplein’s emerging 
stigma. The project’s leader, the civil servant J. van Mill, was keen to 
stress that just as the other districts of the city did, the Zuidplein com-
plex included a variety of families, among which were some ‘socially 
weak’ ones.44
The fulcrum of the complex was the neighbourhood centre, which 
opened in the summer of 1948 and served as the hub of social re- 
education schemes, ranging from cooking lessons to reading courses 
in the local library. Six social workers, nine so-called family care-
takers, and one youth worker were present at the complex during the 
day. Becoming more than an experiment in social re-education, the 
project developed into an experiment in the engineering of neighbour-
hood life. The kind of social templates underpinning the visions of 
the postwar urbanite became apparent in the many mandatory activi-
ties: labour training pushed the men towards becoming hard-working 
fathers; cooking, sewing and cleaning courses, as well as information 
about infancy and upbringing, were geared towards rendering caring 
and nurturing housewives; youth activities, such as going on field trips, 
had the  principal aim of instilling the values of ‘order and neatness’ in 
the new generation.
Essentially, the Zuidplein project was a mode of governmentality 
aimed at regulating and shaping the conduct of the patriarchal nuclear 
family, the desired social basis for the residents of the neighbour-
hood units under construction in postwar Rotterdam; it was an internal 
urban colony whose inhabitants had to be uplifted morally and socially 
before being entitled to the new urban citizenship of the postwar New 
Jerusalem.
However, only months after the neighbourhood centre had opened, 
the experiment at the Zuidplein was confronted by the first postwar 
expansion plans, which integrated the complex into the growing urban 
fabric south of the river Maas. In September 1949, a large apartment 
building (twelve floors) was completed next to the Zuidplein complex. 
Nevertheless, the programme continued well into the 1950s. The peri-
odical evaluation of the experiment produced an ever-more fine-grained 
set of criteria to determine whether a family was social or socially 
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weak. Questionnaires distributed among the inhabitants and reports by 
its paid personnel generated a body of statistics that gradually revealed 
the relative failure of the experiment. The number of families at the 
complex hovered around 400, with some decrease from 1956 onwards, 
of which 168 at the highest (in 1950) and 49 at the lowest (in 1952) 
were considered to have made progress, i.e., they qualified to move to a 
‘normal’ neighbourhood. The number of families branded ‘unaffected’ 
by the scheme varied from 212 to 334 (between 53 and 82%), whereas 
the percentages of families that had ‘degenerated’ fluctuated between 5 
and 12% in the period 1950–1956.45
From 1957 onwards, the emergency village was gradually demol-
ished. In 1958, the municipality withdrew from the project and let urban 
sprawl – of the new neighbourhoods – prevail.46 The amount of social 
work and surveillance was reduced in 1958 as well. The responsibility 
for social care was handed over to a new private foundation that would 
continue to promote ‘social rehabilitation’ in the remaining dwellings 
at the Zuidplein. In 1965 the last remnants of the complex were demol-
ished, and in 1968 the privatized social-work foundation stopped its 
activities.47 This closed the two-stage episode of internal colonization 
in Rotterdam.
Conclusion
By using internal colonization as an interpretative framework for the 
case of post-blitz resettlement, the nature of what may be called the 
experimental interlude of the 1940s and early 1950s becomes manifest. 
Particularly in terms of social politics, such as the resettlement of blitz 
victims, this period may be seen as a highly experimental parenthe-
sis during which the soon-to-be-promulgated centralized frameworks 
of welfarism (e.g., health care, spatial planning, social provisions, and 
housing) were not yet in place or fully operational. Against the back-
ground of urgently needed repair and recovery, this politico-adminis-
trative void allowed local officials and professionals to act upon local 
circumstances without experiencing much interference due to central-
ized rules and regulations.
More generally, internal colonization can be employed as an analyti-
cal marker that encapsulates instances of demarcated settlement under 
surveillance through statecraft that is underpinned by aspirations of 
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ameliorating man and/or nature. As such, it enables historians to con-
nect and interrelate similar practices beyond existing tenets of time, 
geography, and historical discourse that inform most historiographies 
of planning and internal colonization. By discarding the rural-urban 
divide and by stressing similarities between motivations, discourses, 
and actual practices over time, a more encompassing historical narra-
tive might be produced by internal colonization scholarship.
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